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Executive Summary 
 
• This report studies employment effects associated with the adoption of modern 
biotechnology in Danish industry. In this context we also examine industry structure, 
patterns of job creation, key outputs such as patents and the pipeline of projects in clinical 
trials. To see the development of Danish biotech firms in a relevant context we compare a 
Danish segment of biotech firms with a matching Swedish segment.  
• From an overall assessment modern biotechnology, despite the three decades elapsed since 
the first genetic manipulation, is still in a stage of experimentation, learning how to turn its 
new tools and approaches into an operational, reliable, cost-effective technology, 
sufficiently “pluggable” with other technologies. Therefore employment directly related to 
biotech is particularly visible and identifiable in firms focused on R&D. Outside this core of 
R&D activity other industries appear as early adopters of biotech, but only parts of their 
activities relate to modern biotechnology. From the outside it is difficult to isolate what 
share of their employment is attributable to their activities within biotechnology. 
 
• In pursuit of clarity on the role of biotechnology this report studies a segment of Drug 
Discovery Firms (DDFs), which almost exclusively are based on capabilities in biotech 
research. This delimitation gives the advantage of studying a homogenous segment of firms. 
At the same time, this segment of biotech research firms is an informative indicator of the 
ability of the Danish economy to perform in the transition towards knowledge and science-
based competitiveness. That is so because DDFs to an unusual extent depend on the ability 
of their framework to perform as an innovation system, by which we refer to advantages 
growing out of interactions and complementarities between e.g. universities, firms and 
venture capital. That makes DDFs a sensitive “seismograph” for the ability of the Danish 
innovation system to foster new science-based technologies.  
 
Structure 
• The Danish DDF segment in 2004 consisted of 49 firms with 1012 employees. Most of 
these firms came into existence in the four-year period 1999-2002.  
 
• In 1997 the Danish segment was only half the size of the Swedish counterpart, but by 2004 
slightly outnumbered the Swedish segment regarding number of firms. The entire Danish 
segment, in other words, is comparatively younger than its Swedish counter part. Danish 
employment throughout the period remained below the Swedish level.     
 
• Comparing the size structure of the Danish and Swedish segments reveals quite similar 
profiles for the number of micro firms (≤ 9 employees) and their employment. The key 
difference lies in the strong concentration of about half of all employment in the Swedish 
segment in one large firm, whereas Denmark has almost all its employment equally divided 
between firms in the two size categories of 10-49 and 50-199 employees. 
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Investment 
• For almost all years included in this study (1997-2004) investments are higher in Denmark 
than in Sweden. Until 2001 invested DKK per Danish employee was about two times 
higher. Following the drastic decline in investment levels from 2001 onwards the two 
countries temporarily converge, until Denmark in 2004 again invests at intensity two times 
above the Swedish level.  
 
• Both increase and subsequent decline in employment associated with the investment bubble 
in 2000-2001 are heavily concentrated in firms with more than 50 employees. These firms 
constitute about 10% of each DDF segment in Denmark and Sweden.  
 
• The upswing of the bubble involved notably larger job creation in Sweden, but due to one 
firm only. Job creation in the upswing was remarkably similar in the two countries if we 
disregard this single firm. 
 
• The overall decline in employment caused by the reduction in investments after 2001 is 
surprisingly modest. For the two countries combined the total 2002-2003 reduction of 411 
jobs represents 15% of the employment recorded for 2002. This reduction breaks down into 
merely a 7% reduction for Denmark, whereas Swedish DDFs take a three times larger cut of 
21%. One of the likely causes for this difference is the generally higher level of previous 
investments per employee in Danish firms, which gives Danish DDFs added financial 
robustness against a turbulent investment climate.  
 
• The overall effects of the steep decrease in investments represent what could be termed a 
“soft shakeout” whereby firms rarely are brought to close down altogether. Instead they are 
being maintained in existence, but subjected to a cut-back in resources forcing them into 
prioritisation and selection of activities and objectives. 
 
Patents 
• Denmark and Sweden exhibit strikingly similar patenting per invested DKK. However, 
patenting per employee shows a different picture.  In the 1997-2004 period Danish DDFs on 
average produced 0.08 patents per employee per year, 1.4 times higher than the 
corresponding average Swedish level of 0.056. The higher Danish patenting per employee 
plausibly may be explained by the higher capital-intensity in Danish DDFs. 
 
Projects 
• Projects in clinical trials are key outputs from DDF activities, and could be seen as the 
meeting point where preceding efforts in pre-clinical inventiveness (as reflected in patents) 
are brought to bear on the actual commercial potential of the DDF.  
• In 2004 firms on average had 2.2 projects in their pipeline; however, the Swedish average of 
1.8 being notably lower that the Danish level of 2.6. This Danish lead is focused in the 
medium range of the size structure. Danish firms with 10-49 employees have 3.7 projects 
while those with 50-199 have 10.2 projects per firm, in both cases more than 2 times above 
their Swedish counterparts.  
• The higher Danish project-productivity most likely grows out of the same investment-
advantage, also argued to be behind the higher Danish patent-productivity. A stronger 
capital basis allows firms not only to deliver more patented inventions but also to push those 
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inventions further into a larger portfolio of projects in clinical trials.  This Danish 
investment advantage appears to be particularly focused in the middle of the size structure, 
i.e. in firms with 10-200 employees, precisely where the Danish DDB segment has a notably 
higher concentration of firms compared to the Swedish counterpart.  
 
General conclusion 
• The Danish DDF segment has been notably better funded by venture capital than has its 
Swedish counterpart. Findings reported in this study suggest that Danish DDFs have 
translated their better financing into stronger inventiveness, as measured by patents per 
employee. More important for commercial performance, it also seems to have brought about 
a stronger ability on part of Danish DDFs to transform patented innovations into a higher 
number of projects in clinical trials, again measured per employee.  
 
• An important question raised by this coherent theme in our findings concerns the role of 
innovation systems. If Danish firms are more productive it is because they are better funded. 
But they could be so for different reasons. One explanation for their better funding could be 
that the Danish institutional framework provides stronger links between venture capital 
firms and DDF, i.e. seeing the advantage as residing in the innovation system. A rivalling 
explanation could argue that Danish DDFs, regardless of their institutional setting, simply 
are better at attracting venture capital, e.g. because they pursue less uncertain discovery 
strategies in their research, or because they apply different business models, or differ by 
other attributes which are essentially firm-internal . It is a worthwhile agenda for further 
research to examine if better funding of Danish DDFs grows out of strategies at the firm 
level, or out of qualities in the Danish innovation system.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 What this study is about  
Biotechnology plays an important role in Denmark’s effort to perform in high technologies 
(Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2001). Biotech has been the target of some of the most concentrated 
efforts in Danish science and technology policy, as exemplified by the BIOTEK and FØTEK 
programmes through the 1990s and by today’s national strategic research programmes, where 
biotech still is a top priority. 
This report studies employment effects associated with adoption of modern biotechnology in Danish 
industry, focusing on the following issues:  
o How is the Danish biotechnology structured in terms of firm-size? E.g. to what extent is 
employment concentrated in a few firms vs. being distributed across a multitude of small firms?  
o What has the pattern of job creation been since the biotech sector emerged in the mid-1990s? 
Has employment grown primarily by continual entry of new small firms or by growth in 
existing firms? 
o What types of firms were more robust in terms of retaining employment when biotechnology in 
2001 was affected by a major decline in investments?   
o Are there pronounced differences between small and large biotech firms in output per employee 
in terms of patents and projects in clinical trials? 
To see the development of Danish biotech firms in a relevant context we compare, throughout the 
study, a carefully delimited segment of Danish biotech firms with a matching Swedish segment.  
1.2 Understanding employment trends in emergent technologies 
Biotechnology1 belongs to a category of “basic technologies” (Stankiewicz, 1990), also referred to 
as “general purpose technologies” (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998). Like semiconductors, lasers 
and other technologies in this category, biotechnology introduces fundamentally new technical 
principles, embodied in a novel technology, which subsequently becomes part of a broad range of 
other technologies. Rather than offering user-value by itself, a basic technology becomes a 
significant driver of economic growth by becoming part of other technologies, radically improving 
the performance/cost ratios by which the latter provide user-value.  
This process takes an emerging basic technology through a sequence of three fairly distinct stages 
(Grupp, 1992;  Schmoch and Frietsch 2006; Valentin and Jensen, 2002):   
I) A stage of initial introduction of novel principles and potentials, attracting immediate awareness 
in the global science and technology community.  
II) A prolonged stage - in some cases lasting several decades - of experimentation and learning 
how to turn the new basic principles into an operational, reliable, cost-effective technology, 
sufficiently “pluggable” with the other technologies. While this second, prolonged stage 
involves sizable efforts in R&D, job creation remains limited and occurs mostly within R&D.  
III) A take-off stage when the new basic technology is mature enough to offer opportunities for 
innovation and product improvements across a broad range of industrial sectors, in many cases 
                                                 
1 We follow OECD in defining biotechnology as “the application of science and technology to living organisms, as well 
as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the production of knowledge, goods and 
services” ( OECD, 2005). 
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given rise to significant increases in employment (Soete and Freeman, 1987; Freeman and 
Soete, 1997; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998).   
Modern biotechnology, despite the three decades elapsed since the first genetic manipulation, is still 
from an overall assessment in Stage II. This is not to deny that its toolbox has developed 
significantly and that many applications have appeared, particularly in pharmaceuticals, agriculture 
and food processing. When biotechnology nevertheless is assessed as a Stage II technology it is 
primarily because of large remaining shortcomings in our understanding and control of living 
matter. These shortcomings translate into sizable uncertainties in the application of biotechnology 
to specific innovation problems. The areas in which biotechnology has produced results are few 
compared to the huge areas of potential applications which cannot be realized because of 
deficiencies in our understanding and control of the steps required to get there. In that sense 
biotechnology on the whole is far from offering reliable engineering (Drews, 2000; Pisano, 2006).  
Recognizing current biotech as a Stage-II technology has direct implications for our understanding 
of its employment effects. Employment in activities entirely focused on biotechnology is quite 
small, and concentrated predominantly in R&D. Outside this core of R&D activity other industries 
appear as early adopters of biotech but only parts and aspects of their activities relate to modern 
biotechnology (Springham, 1999; Bud, 1993). From the outside it is difficult to isolate what share 
of their employment is specifically attributable to their activities within biotechnology. 
1.3 Implications for delimitation of the biotech sector  
In response to these large variations across industries in the role played by biotechnology, OECD 
has introduced a useful terminology, distinguishing firms based on whether they are active in 
biotechnology regarding merely a minor part of their activity 2, or regarding their predominant 
activity, the latter making them “dedicated biotechnology firms” (DBFs) 3.  
Even the more restrictive OECD definition of DBFs leaves ambiguities concerning the critical 
relationship between biotech R&D and the predominant activity of the firm. I.e. although affecting 
a firm’s predominant activity, biotechnology may constitute a modest element in its R&D. That 
could be the case if the firm applies biotech techniques which largely were acquired from other 
firms, say in the form of instrumentation or licenses. In this case, to what extent would the firm’s 
competitiveness, and the employment derived from it, grow out of its biotech capabilities, as 
distinct from other potential sources of competitiveness, e.g. its abilities in customization or in 
marketing?  
The present study resolves these issues of delimitation by focusing on a segment of firms, which 
compete based virtually only on their capabilities in biotechnological research. Such firm may do 
research in a variety fields (e.g. food- or environmental biotech). In reality, however, most biotech 
firms have their research focused on discovery and early development of pharmaceutical drugs. We 
refer to them as Drug Discovery Firms (DDFs), this way also denoting that by and large they 
confine their activities to the early stages of the drug discovery cycle. The high costs of taking drug 
candidates through clinical trials, manufacturing, and marketing are largely beyond their financial 
reach. In a few cases DDFs on their own move into clinical trials. But in most cases at this point 
                                                 
2 Biotechnology active firms, as defined by OECD refers to all firms “engaged in key biotechnology activities such as 
the application of at least one biotechnology technique […] to produce goods or services and/or the performance of 
biotechnology R&D […]” ( OECD, 2005). 
3 Dedicated biotechnology firms, in the OECD definition, are “biotechnology active firm whose predominant activity 
involves the application of biotechnology techniques to produce goods or services and/or the performance of 
biotechnology R&D” ( OECD, 2005). 
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they join forces with a large pharmaceutical firm acquiring (parts of) subsequent exploitation rights, 
thus generating revenues for the DDF for further research.  
Excluded from our segment of DDF, in other words, are the much larger Danish pharmaceutical 
firms, e.g. Novo and Lundbeck, because they operate value chains including other significant 
components in addition to the biotech aspects of their R&D. That is the key reason why both 
employment and performance indicators reported in the present study differ markedly from 
previous studies of the Danish biotechnology, which have delimited the sector by different criteria  
(e.g. Ernst and Young, 2006). To enhance comparison of findings reported in this paper with 
previous studies on Danish biotechnology, Appendix 1 offers an overview of differences in 
delimitations. 
Fig. 1 visualises the criteria for 
delimiting biotech firms, clarifying 
definitions in the present study, as 
they differ from standard OECD 
definitions.  
Definitions present trade-offs: 
OECD’s broad definition of 
“biotechnology active firms” 
includes all firms with at least 
some involvement in biotech, at 
the cost of leaving the intensity and 
the nature of that involvement 
quite unclear. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the very narrow 
definition of Drug Discovery Firms 
applied in this study includes firms 
which do very little else than biotech research. That greatly enhances homogeneity in the segment 
we study, and brings clarity on its involvement in biotech. We apply this definition, however, at the 
cost of focusing on relatively few Danish firms (currently around 50) with a limited volume of 
employment (currently around 1000 employees).  
 
In addition to preferences for distinctness and homogeneity in the object studied, there are 
additional reasons behind our focus on DDFs. A key element in the methodology of the present 
study is the comparison of Danish with Swedish biotech firms. A broad definition of biotech firms 
implies ambiguity about which types of biotech activity would be included in this comparison. With 
our restricted focus on DDFs, on the other hand, we obtain a more robust comparison of same type 
of biotech firms in the two countries.  
 
The last, and perhaps most important, reason for focusing narrowly on DDFs is that this definition 
best reflects why the World so intensely is observing the performance of commercial 
biotechnology. Put simply, this segment of biotech research firms is one of the best indicators on 
how economies perform in the transition towards knowledge and science-based competitiveness. 
That is so because DDFs to an unusual extent depend on the ability of their surrounding framework 
to perform as an innovation system, by which we refer to advantages growing out of interactions 
and complementarities between e.g. universities, firms and venture capital (McKelvey, Rickne, 
Laage-Hellman, 2004; Valentin and Jensen, 2004). As compared to larger firms with much broader 
portfolios of technologies and strategic assets, the exclusive focus of DDFs on fairly long-term 
Biotech applied 
and addressed 
in the firm’s R&D
Predominant 
part of firm’s 
activities
Biotechnology active 
firms (OECD def.)
Some part 
of firm’s 
activites
Scope of application of biotech 
techniques behind the output of firms
Dedicated biotech 
firms (OECD def.)
Typology of 
firms involved in 
biotech
Biotech research 
firms (this report)
Biotech Drug Discovery 
Firms (DDFs) (this report) 
= Activity  is defining 
charactestic
Symbols: = Activity may or may 
not be present
Drug disc. research 
Other 
research 
Drug disc. 
research 
Fig. 1: Visualisation of defining criteria for biotech firms
At least one biotech technique
Several biotech 
techniques
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research render them far more sensitive to critical inputs from outside the firm. E.g. without 
competent venture capital they will not get started nor move far ahead (Audretsch, 2001; Niosi and 
Banik, 2005). Without rich interaction with academic science they lack the access to skills, spill-
overs and talents which is critical for both their key inventions and their day-to-day problem solving 
(Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, Brewer, 1996;  Valentin and Jensen 2006). Therefore DDFs to an 
extreme extent are “extrovert” firms. Precisely that quality turns them into an informative indicator 
of the ability of their host systems to handle the transition into tomorrow’s knowledge- and science-
based economy. What makes careful observation of the evolution and performance of 50 DDFs a 
worthwhile exercise, at the end of the day, is their role as “seismograph” for this more fundamental 
ability in Danish society.  
1.4 Structure, data and reporting formats 
This report begins by giving, in the next section, an overview of the entry of new DDFs since 1997, 
along with changes in employment for different firm-sizes. Section 3 examines changes in 
employment associated with shifts in investment levels, focusing particularly on the investment 
decline in 2001. Patents and projects taken into clinical trials are major outputs of DDFs. Sections 4 
and 5 analyse these outputs and their associated levels of productivity. As illustrated in Fig. 2, these 
outputs play an important role for the financial performance of firms. Multiple additional factors, 
omitted in this report, should be included in a more exhaustive attempt to explain financial 
performance of firms. Important resource inflows for DDFs 
consist not only of the factors of manpower and capital, but 
also of e.g. recruitment of scientific and managerial talent, 
in-licensed technologies and spill-overs of academic 
research. Outputs could also include e.g. number of deals 
with big pharma in the form of out-licensed projects or 
other indications of successfully traded research results.  
This study draws on data extracted from SCANBIT (Scandinavian Biotech), a proprietary database 
developed and maintained by Research Centre on Biotech Business at Copenhagen Business 
School4. Using the firm as its unit of analysis SCANBIT, for all Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian 
biotech firms, integrates data on employment, patenting, project pipeline, investments, financial 
performance and a range of additional variables. Data are updated on a yearly basis and in most 
cases have been reconstructed for all years since the firm was established.   
Firms are grouped by size into 4 categories as follows:  
 
Data are reported for the time span 1997-2004. The year 
of 1997 is taken as the point of departure, because that is 
when the Danish DDF segment becomes visible. Prior to 
that only 5 DDF were active in Denmark, but in 1997 that 
number doubles, and steep growth follows until 2001. 
Reporting ends with 2004, which is the final year for 
which we have full coverage for the various indicators  
included in our presentation.  
 
Numbers are  presented with “,” as 1000 separator and “.” as decimal point.   
                                                 
4  See further www.cbs.dk/biotech and www.biotechbusiness.dk 
Fig. 2: Conceptual framework 
Resources Outputs Performance 
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2 Overall development in number of firms and employment 
 
In 1997 the Danish DDF segment consisted of 11 firms with a total work force of less than 200 
employees (Fig. 3). The segment grew five-fold over the next 8 years, particularly steep increases 
occurring 1999-2001. Effects of declining investments after 2001 did not entirely prevent 
establishment of a few additional firma in 2003, but employment took a modest decrease from 2002 
onwards.  
 
The Danish DDF segment, in other words, as a whole emerged fairly abruptly over a very short 
span of years. More detailed information behind the trends in Fig. 3 shows that 5 of the 11 firms 
recorded for 1997 in fact were established that year, and the remaining half was only a few years 
old. Neurosearch, established in 1988, is the oldest Danish DDF. Growth of the segment levelled 
off after 2002, but on a positive note that also implies a fairly robust survival rate of firm and 
employment in a climate of declining investments 
 
The Swedish DDF segment in 1997 was about twice the size of its Danish counterpart. Information 
behind the figures shows that 7 of the 21 Swedish firms recorded for 1997 were established through 
the 1980’es. Two firms were established decades earlier, and shifted into modern biotechnology 
during the 1980s. Compared to its Danish counterpart the Swedish segment entering the investment 
boom at the turn of the millennium consists of more mature firms, and even of some sizeable 
veterans.  
 
By year 2002 Sweden is overtaken by 
Denmark in terms of number firms. Sweden 
maintains, however, a higher level of overall 
employment, not least because of its steeper 
increase during the investment boom up till 
2001, and even beyond, before a more 
drastic decline occurs from 2002 to 2003. 
By 2004 the overall profiles in terms of 
number of firms and employment of the two 
segments are remarkably similar. But behind 
that similarity are notable differences 
between the DDF segments in the two 
countries in terms of maturity of firms, and 
in terms of the technology generations 
during which they came into existence.   
 
Further insights into the structure and evolution of the two segments is offered by Tables 1 and 2 
which for 4 size categories5 examine number of firms and total employment 1997-2004. The two 
tables present figures not only for the first and final years of that period, but also for the height of 
the investment bubble in 2000 and for the following years (2002 and 2003). The most interesting 
points appear when each size category is characterised using figures from both tables.  
 
                                                 
5 Size for each firm is determined by its number of employee in any given year. I.e. a firm may shift size category 
between 1997 and 2000.  
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Table 1 Number of firms in five selected years in the 1997-2004 period by size and by country        
DK ≤ 9 10-49 50-199 ≥ 200 Total 
Year N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total
1997 8 72.73% 2 18.18% 1 9.09% 0 0.00% 11 100.00%
2000 15 46.88% 15 46.88% 2 6.25% 0 0.00% 32 100.00%
2002 24 50.00% 18 37.50% 6 12.50% 0 0.00% 48 100.00%
2003 27 52.94% 19 37.25% 5 9.80% 0 0.00% 51 100.00%
2004 26 53.06% 18 36.73% 5 10.20% 0 0.00% 49 100.00%
SE ≤ 9 10-49 50-199 ≥ 200 Total 
Year N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total
1997 15 71.43% 4 19.05% 1 4.76% 1 4.76% 21 100.00%
2000 33 82.50% 5 12.50% 1 2.50% 1 2.50% 40 100.00%
2002 27 61.36% 12 27.27% 4 9.09% 1 2.27% 44 100.00%
2003 28 63.64% 11 25.00% 4 9.09% 1 2.27% 44 100.00%
2004 28 66.67% 9 21.43% 4 9.52% 1 2.38% 42 100.00%
 
Table 2  Employment in five selected years in the 1997-2004 period by firm-size and by country 
DK ≤ 9 10-49 50-199 ≥ 200 Total 
Year N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total
1997 20 11.63% 53 30.81% 99 57.56% 0 0.00% 172 100.00%
2000 23 3.94% 361 61.82% 200 34.25% 0 0.00% 584 100.00%
2002 66 5.69% 522 45.00% 572 49.31% 0 0.00% 1160 100.00%
2003 79 7.34% 518 48.10% 480 44.57% 0 0.00% 1077 100.00%
2004 63 6.23% 504 49.80% 445 43.97% 0 0.00% 1012 100.00%
SE ≤ 9 10-49 50-199 ≥ 200 Total 
Year N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total N % of total
1997 23 4.71% 80 16.39% 57 11.68% 328 67.21% 488 100.00%
2000 73 12.07% 113 18.68% 82 13.55% 337 55.70% 605 100.00%
2002 74 4.76% 239 15.38% 391 25.16% 850 54.70% 1554 100.00%
2003 65 5.30% 208 16.97% 395 32.22% 558 45.51% 1226 100.00%
2004 77 6.40% 182 15.13% 367 30.51% 577 47.96% 1203 100.00%
Source: ScanBit 
 
 
 
Large firms (≥ 200): Denmark has no firms in this category at any point during the 8 years. Sweden 
has 1 firm recorded throughout the period, accounting for about half of all employment (even two 
thirds in 1997), substantially affecting the relative position of all other size groups. Behind this one 
observation we actually find two firms, Active Biotech until 2002, when its employment dropped 
below 200, while Biovitrum at the same time took its place in this category. Active Biotech after 
2002 accounts for about half of all employment in medium sized DDFs. Both firms trace important 
parts of their origin to the fully integrated pharmaceutical firm of Pharmacia. Active Biotech was 
established in the early 1980s, but the firm of today primarily originates in the 1997 merger of 
Pharmacia and Upjohn when a research project was spun out, involving transfer to Active Biotech 
of about 165 researchers.  Biovitrum was formed as a spin-off when Pharmacia in 2001 changed its 
therapeutic focus. In 2004 Biovitrum registered 577 employees. 
Medium sized firms (50-199): Neither of the two countries at any point have more than 6 firms in 
this size category. But this category is more important in the Danish case, accounting during 2003-4 
for 44% of all Danish DDF employment, as compared to about 31% of Swedish DDF employment.  
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Small firms (20-49): During 2002-4 this category in Denmark comprised 37% of the firms and 45 – 
50% of its employment. During the same years, in the Swedish case this category included 21-27% 
of the firms and 15-17 % of employment.   
Micro firms (≤ 9) during 2002-4 in Denmark included 50-53% of the firms, and 61-67% of the 
firms in the Swedish segment, in both cases accounting for about 5% of employment.  
 
Summary: 
• Danish DDFs by 2004 consists of 49 firms and 1012 employees. Most of these firms came into 
existence in the four-year period 1999-2002. Overall reduction in employment and in number of 
firms was modest in response to the investment decline after 2001. The entire Danish segment is 
comparatively younger than its Swedish counterpart.  
 
• In 1997 the Danish segment was only half the size of the Swedish counterpart, but by the end of 
the period slightly outnumbered the Swedish segment regarding number of firms. Danish 
employment throughout the period remained below the Swedish level.     
 
• When comparing the size structure of the Danish and Swedish segments quite similar profiles 
are observed for the number of micro firms and their employment. The key difference lies in the 
strong concentration of about half of all employment in the Swedish segment in one large firm, 
whereas Denmark has almost all its employment equally divided between firms in the two size 
categories of 10-49 and 50-199 employees 
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3 Investment and employment  
 
This section examines fluctuation in investment and effects on employment, with an emphasis on 
the influence of the investment bubble on both job creation during its upswing and employment 
reductions after the steep decline in 2001. (See Appendix 2 for a brief account of the global 
investment bubble and the pattern by which it affected Danish biotech.) 
 
For each of the two countries Fig. 4 shows Danish Kroner invested each year as equity in DDFs 
both through public offerings and through private investments. Both total amounts and DKK per 
employee are shown. In almost all eight years total investments are higher in Denmark, the 
difference to Sweden being particularly large 1999-2001, and again in 2004. Swedish investments 
are particularly modest in 1999. 
Until 2001 invested DKK per Danish 
employee was about two times 
higher than the Swedish level. 
Following the drastic decline in 
investment levels from 2001 
onwards the two countries converge, 
until Denmark in 2004 again invests 
at intensity two times above the 
Swedish level.  
 
Fig. 4 also brings out the uniqueness 
of year 2000 when investments 
soared to twice the level of what they 
have been in any other year. The 
early parts of 2001 brought overall 
investments for that year also 
notably above subsequent years. The 
crisis, which became apparent during 
that year, meant several years of 
declining investment, bringing 2003 
below the level from 1998. 
The nature of this cutback in 
investments is brought out in Fig. 5, 
where columns indicate average 
sums, in Mio. DKK, mobilised in 
investment rounds for each year. The 
curve shows the pct. share of all 
firms going through capital rounds or 
IPOs per year. For the entire period 
1997-2004 this share varied in the 
range of 25-50%, and was 
particularly high in 2000-2001 
before it dropped close to 30% in 
2002. Notably more dramatic shifts 
Figure 4  Private and public equity investments and amount  
per employee in DK and SE  
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Figure 5 Average amount per investment round and share  
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occur in the invested amounts, which in 2000-2001 on average was above 100 mio. DKK per round, 
but dropped in 2003 to about 20 mio. DKK. The decline in investments, in other words, only to a 
moderate degree was about capital injections disappearing altogether. It was a lot more about each 
injection making radically less resources available to the recipient DDF.   
Table 3 shows how DDF employment in the two countries responded to the investment bubble. 
Unlike the previous tables, figures in Table 3 do not refer to employment as per each year. Instead 
figures refer to changes in employment associated with four different phases of the investment 
cycle, i.e. net difference in employment from the first to the last year of each phase. Furthermore, 
this net difference has been broken down by firm-sizes6.  
 
Table 3 Change in employment by firm-size, by year and by country for four  
separate phases of the 2001 investment bubble 
Year 1997-2000 2000-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 
Country SE DK SE DK SE DK SE DK 
  N N N N N N N N 
≤ 9 50 3 1 43 -9 13 12 -16 
10-49 33 308 126 161 -31 -4 -26 -14 
50-199 25 101 309 372 4 -92 -28 -35 
≥ 200 9 0 513 0 -292 0 19 0 
Total 117 412 949 576 -328 -83 -23 -65 
Source: ScanBit  
 
The following changes should be noted. 
Phase 1, 1997-2000, moderate growth: Overall Swedish growth of 117 employees is heavily 
concentrated in micro firms. The Danish increase in employment is 3.5 times above the Swedish 
level and is concentrated in the somewhat larger firms categorised as “small firms”. 
Phase 2, 2000-2002, hyper growth: Swedish DDFs show aggregate growth of almost 1000 new 
jobs. More than half of this increase is associated with the above-mentioned establishment of the 
single firm of Biovitrum, but notable increase in employment (of 309) also takes place in medium-
sized firms. The Danish aggregate increase of 576 employees corresponds to only 60% of the 
Swedish growth, but has a similar concentration in medium-sized firms.  
Phase 3, 2002-2003, steep reduction: The Swedish decline of 328 jobs is about 4 times larger than 
the Danish cutback of 83 employees. Still, relative to aggregate employment levels in 2002 (Table 
3) this amounts for the Swedish segment to a reduction of 21%, while for Denmark it is 7%. In both 
countries the cutback predominantly takes place in the largest firms. For Sweden that means its 
single large firm, while for Denmark it happens in the 6 medium-sized firms.  
Phase 4, 2003-2004, adjustment: Reductions almost come to an end in Sweden, and is actually 
reversed into modest growth for its largest and smallest firms. Denmark takes a further small 
reduction (65 jobs), quite evenly distributed on all size categories.  
To sum up: 
• For almost all years included in this study (1997-2004) investments are higher in Denmark than 
in Sweden. Until 2001 invested DKK per Danish employee was about two times higher. 
                                                 
6 Firms in Table 3 are categorised by size according to the employment at the end of each phase.  
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Following the drastic decline in investment levels from 2001 onwards the two countries 
temporarily converge, until Denmark in 2004 again invests at intensity two times above the 
Swedish level.  
• Both increase and subsequent decline in employment associated with the investment bubble are 
heavily concentrated in firms with more than 50 employees. These firms constitute about 10% 
of each DDF segment in Denmark and Sweden (Table 1).  
• The upswing involves notably larger job creation in Sweden, but due to one firm only. Job 
creation in the upswing is remarkably similar in the two countries if we disregard this single 
observation. 
• The overall decline in employment caused by the reduction in investments after 2001 (Fig. 4) is 
surprisingly modest. For the two countries combined the total 2002-2003 reduction of 411 jobs 
represents 21% of the employment recorded for 2002. This reduction breaks down into merely a 
7% reduction for Denmark, whereas Swedish DDFs take a three times larger cut of 21%. A 
likely cause for this difference is the generally higher level of previous investments per 
employee in Danish firms, which gives Danish DDFs added financial robustness against a 
turbulent investment climate.  
The overall effects of the steep decrease in investments represent what could be termed a “soft 
shakeout” whereby firms rarely are brought to close down altogether (as reflected also in the 
aggregate number of firms in Fig 3). Instead they are being maintained in existence, but subjected to 
a cut-back in resources forcing them into prioritisation and selection of activities and objectives.  
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4 Patents    
Fig.6 shows the steep rise in patenting associated with the increasing entry of new firms and the rise 
in employment after 1997, until effects of the investment crisis becomes visible in 2002. The 
number of employees is shown both for the year of patent filing (t0), and for the previous year (t-1). 
The t0 employment curve gives a better fit during the period of steeply increasing patenting (1999-
2001), while t-1 offers better fit for the decline 2003-4.  
These preliminary observations 
suggest that a closer look at patenting 
productivity would be useful. Fig. 7 
shows numbers of patents per 
employee (referred to as Patent 
Employee Productivity  - PEP) for the 
two countries, revealing quite notable 
differences. Swedish PEP converges 
towards the higher Danish level and 
exceeds it in 2000 and 2001, before it 
again drops to a lower level during the 
last 3 years. However, the overall 
effect of the difference is that 
Denmark on the average for the 8 
years have produced 0.08 patents per 
employee, 1.4 times higher than the 
corresponding average Swedish level 
of 0.056.  
To examine possible causes for this 
striking difference between the two 
countries Fig. 8 reports on patenting 
productivity, calculated on the basis of 
number of patents filed in a given year 
divided by total equity investment (Mio. 
DKK) in the same year. This measure 
for “Patent Capital-Productivity” (PCP) 
sees Sweden soaring to the extremely 
high value of 1.66 in 1999. In that year a 
minimum of equity was raised (comp. 
Fig 4 above.), explaining this divergent 
figure as the result of patenting being 
maintained at its normal level during a 
single year, while investments decline to 
an all-time low. A higher Swedish PCP 
level also is observed for 1997.  
Apart from these two years, the Danish and the Swedish PCP curves virtually overlap, i.e. demon-
strating strikingly similar patenting per invested DKK in the two countries. The higher Danish PEP, 
in other words, comes about largely because of the higher capital-intensity in Danish DDFs.  
Figure 6 Number of patents filed per year and total number 
of employees in same and previous year. Danish 
and Swedish figures consolidated 
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Figure 7 Number of patents per employee separate  
for Danish and Swedish firms 
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Such capital advantages could mean 
many different things, such as access 
to better research instrumentation. It 
also would allow for more widespread 
use of outsourced research activities, 
allowing firms to focus their internal 
research on their particular area of 
expertise. It also would translate into 
higher medium-term financial stability, 
and hence a better basis for planning.  
In this interpretation, what could 
account for the temporary convergence 
of Danish and Swedish PEP levels 
around year 2000? The Danish side of 
this convergence comes in the form of 
a moderately declining PEP level, conceivably attributable to a steep increase in investments 
targeting a highly immature DDF segment. Investment precisely at this juncture, we learn from 
Table 1 to a notable extent went into the establishment of new firms or into small, recently 
established firms, both of which would entail initial low PEP levels for the firms in question.   
The Swedish increasing side of the convergence arguably comes out of the same logic, i.e. being 
based on steep increase in investments which to a comparatively higher extent flow into existing 
larger firms, better capable of translating notable expansion of their resources into higher PEP. 
 
Figure 8 Number of patents per mio DKK separate  
for Danish and Swedish firms 
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5 Projects  
The second type of output from DDFs to be considered in this report is projects, which refer to 
clinical tests of drug candidates in Stages I-II-III. The value of a drug candidate increases notably 
when proven feasible for clinical trials, and as it progressively passes the considerable risks of 
failure during the three stages. Clinical tests also are costly, so DDFs often carry them out in a 
contractual arrangement with large pharmaceutical firms. The latter in recent years have seen their 
own internal pipeline of drug candidates declining, increasingly making them dependent on the new 
projects they can acquire from DDFs. Such project contracts are valuable for DDFs not only in the 
direct sense of generating revenue (and sometimes also equity), but also by signalling what the DDF 
has to offer, turning such contracts into assets for further attraction of investments. These attributes 
make projects a key output from DDFs. They are, so to speak, the meeting point where preceding 
efforts in pre-clinical inventiveness (as reflected in patents) are brought to bear on the actual 
commercial potential of the DDF. 
We bring data on the number of active 
projects, for each year, in Danish and 
Swedish DDFs. Projects stretching over 
the turn of year are counted for both 
years, and projects indeed may also have 
durations exceeding 12 months. Even 
though that implies that any one project 
may enter figures for two consecutive 
years (or more), for our analytical 
purposes this may be assumed to be a 
random attribute. Combining 
information on both Danish and Swedish 
DDFs, Fig. 9 shows the moderate 
increase in projects until 2000, followed 
by a steeper growth, quadrupling their 
number over four years. Increases 
continue also during declining 
employment after 2002. A clinical project 
launched by a DDF in 2003 would be 
based on a large body of research carried 
out during the preceding 3-4 years, which 
partly explains how more projects come 
out of a declining number of employees. 
Another part of the explanation 
undoubtedly has got to do with redirection 
of resources, giving added priority,  in 
times of financial stress, to take projects 
into clinical trials to generate revenue 
(from alliances with big pharma) and to 
better prepare the DDF for the next 
investment round.  
Fig. 10 compares Denmark and Sweden in terms of the ability of DDFs to generate new projects, 
showing fairly consistent Danish increases from the 1997 level of 1.18 projects per firm to a level of 
Figure 9 Number of projects in clinical trial and total  
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2.6 projects in 2004. Swedish firms were at a considerably lower level in 1997 (0.4), increase 
moderately until 2001, after which they decline to their initial level. Fig. 10 also shows a dotted 
graph for Swedish DDFs, indicating a steep increase from 2002 onwards. This is the trend for 
Swedish firms when they include the single firm of SkyePharma. Only in some respects did 
SkyePharma belong in the category of DDFs when in 2002 it was established as a Swedish 
subsidiary of SkyePharma PLC, UK7. Increasingly it diversified out of this category until its 
activities in 2005 were transferred to other parts of the SkyePharma group outside Sweden. 
To clarify if the Danish higher 
project productivity has a 
particular concentration Table 4 
gives a breakdown by firm-size 
for 2004. Swedish performance 
is higher in micro firms and of 
course in the largest category 
(≥200), where Denmark is not 
represented. So the overall higher 
Danish performance comes out 
of firms with 10-49 and 50-199 
employees, where Denmark has two times more firms than Sweden (Table 1). 
The higher Danish project-productivity most likely grows out of the same investment-advantage, 
which also appeared behind the higher Danish patent-productivity. A stronger capital basis allows 
firms not only to deliver more patented inventions but also to push those inventions further into a 
larger portfolio of projects in clinical trials.  What Table 4 adds to this understanding is that the 
Danish investment advantage appears to be particularly focused in the middle of the size structure, 
i.e. in firms with 10-200 employees, precisely where the Danish DDB segment has a notably higher 
concentration of firms compared to the Swedish counterpart.  
 
                                                 
7 SkyePharma specialized in drug delivery technologies, developing improvements of existing pharmaceuticals along 
with some new pharmaceuticals. Its delivery technology was the basis for a high number of collaborations in the form 
of in- and out-licencing with large pharmaceutical companies. With a staff of 39 the firm in 2002 undertook 40 projects 
in preclinical and clinical stages. In 2004 the number of employees was reduced to 21 while 34 projects were processed.  
 
Table 4 Number of projects in 2004 per firm,  
by firm size and by country 
Employees  DK SE Total 
≤ 9 0.31    1.21    0.78 
10-49 3.72 (5.33)*   1.75             (4.26)* 3.12 
50-199 10.20    4.50     7.67 
≥ 200   11.00    11.00 
Total 2.57    1,83     2.23 
*)   Figure  including  SkyePharma.                                                Source: ScanBit 
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Appendix 1. Delimitation of biotech firms in this and in previous reports 
Reports on the biotech industry present diverging numbers and figures when describing the industry 
in terms of number of firms, number of employees, R&D expenditures etc. Depending on the 
complex nature of biotechnology and dispersion among several traditional industry categories, 
which normally are based on industry output classifications, delimitations and concept definitions 
applied varies. The table below present an overview of differences in delimitations and use of 
concepts in the present and two previous reports on employment in the Danish biotech industry  
(Bloch 2004;  PLS RAMBØLL MANAGEMENT, 2003) 
 
 
 The present study PLS Rambøll (2003) Bloch (2004) 
Geographic 
boundaries 
Denmark Storkøbenhavn, Frederiksborg, 
Roskilde, Vestsjælland, Storstrøm 
labour market regions (DK) and 
Skåne (SE).  
Denmark 
Number of 
firms 
54 Danish firms 220 Danish firms and 106 Swedish 
firms.  
267 Danish firms  
Number of 
employees 
1077 and 1012 
employees in 2003 
and 2004 
respectively. 
In total about 19.000 employees in the 
region. 
4766 employees in 2003. 
Definitions Own definition, similar 
to but more confined 
than OECD. 
Applies definition similar to OECD. Applies OECD definitions. 
Delimitation See section 1.3 in the 
present report. 
 
Broad definition of biotech industry 
corresponding to OECD definition of 
“biotechnology active firms”, including 
not only R&D firms (R&D and CRO) 
but also production firms (both with in-
house R&D and CMOs applying 
biotechnology processes) and 
suppliers of products and services to 
the firms mentioned above. Process 
developers are excluded. - Includes 
‘Red’,‘Green',and ‘White’ biotech 
firms. About 1/3 are ‘Red’ biotech 
firms. 
Corresponding to OECD 
definitions of “dedicated 
biotech firms” and firms with 
related activities  
 
Including ‘Red’ 
(pharmaceuticals & 
diagnostics), ‘Green’ 
(agricultural), and ‘White’ 
(industrial & environmental) 
biotech firms.  
Employment Annual average 
number of employees 
in each firm. 
Delimited to firms with 20 employees 
or more in industries with a “certain” 
level of biotechnology firms. 
Full time employees. 36 firms 
are assigned estimated 
number of employees.  
Data and 
firm 
identification 
Own list of firms 
gathered from several 
sources, such as web-
sites, industry 
organizations, news 
sources and public 
databases. 
Classification of each 
firm’s business 
activities. Data from 
annual reports. 
Own list of firms based on firms with 
industry codes of biotechnology 
related activities. Interview with 900 
firms to assess relatedness to 
biotechnology activities. Data from 
Danmarks Statistik (DK) and SCB 
(SE), and survey with 39% response 
rate. 
Similar approach as the 
present study. Own survey 
and list of firms gathered from 
various sources, such as 
industry organizations, 
venture capitalists, and news 
sources. Classification of 
firms based on web-site 
information and above 
sources. Data from NewBiz 
Business Information. 
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Appendix 2.  Effects of the 2000-2001 investment bubble on Danish 
biotech 
 
The investment bubble in Scandinavian biotech occurs with a time lag of about one year after the 
US biotech bubble. The US biotech/pharma index reaches its highest peak in the first half of year 
2000 followed by a short but steep downturn. In US biotech a short recovery phase takes place until 
mid 2000, where the index moves downwards, beginning a long-term decline until the beginning of 
2003. The Danish and Swedish biotech/pharma indices almost fluctuate in parallel. The indices 
peak in mid 2001, where the Danish index reaches higher levels and the gap between the 
Scandinavian indices exhibits the greatest gap. From that period on, both indices slope downwards, 
with an accelerating pace in 2002. 
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